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The ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe and U.S. is challenging the conventional wisdom and is 
creating fears of a double dip recession in 2012. Massive levels of debt and consumption beyond 
means and speedy financial innovation with lax regulation has put major economies in a deep hole. 
Monetary policy with ease in rates had been ineffective, to say the least, in generating new jobs in the 
last few years when interest rates were kept at near zero level since 2008 in United State. Fiscal 
stimulus again targeted the undisciplined financial sector which did not use the stimulus for extending 
credit to the private sector as much as was required. With business cycle fluctuations, mounting 
consumer and fiscal debt is unsustainable and one lesson of the crisis is that business cycles are for 
real and here to stay. The securitization of consumer debt magnified the losses and created negative 
unjust effects on savers and taxpayers which had nothing to do with the mess in the first place. Against 
this backdrop, a new paradigm is needed which will put the focus back on productive enterprise, bring 
recovery with job creation, limit and regulate speculative financial institutions and instruments, and 
improve corporate governance by influencing the incentives more deeply and proactively.  
 
Key words: Great recession, great depression, financial crisis, credit crunch, subprime mortgage crisis, 
housing market bubble, securitization, leveraging, shadow banking. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What triggered the crisis in United State was the asset 
bubble in U.S. House market. House prices rose sharply 
after dot com bubble burst and touched the peak in 2005. 
When the house market bubble burst, house prices 
declined even sharply than the incline seen previously as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Bubble in house market was created after the steep 
decline in interest rates following recession in 2000/2001. 
Sharp decline in interest rates and predatory lending to 
sub-prime borrowers founded the beginning of the crisis 
as shown in Figure 2.  
With the repeal of Glass Steagall act, the distinction 
between commercial and investment banking became 
ever more blurred. Commercial banks were able to 
mitigate risk by packaging risky consumer debt 
receivables and selling them to the investment banks. 
The investment banks securitized them and sold them to 
insurance companies, other investment banks, hedge 
funds   etc.  The    underlying   loans   making   up   those 
securities were very risky. In some instances, loan was 
sanctioned at a loan to value ratio of 125%. Adjustable 
rate mortgage, interest only mortgage etc and other luring 
schemes were offered to lend as much as was possible. 
Low interest rates provided the liquidity needed to keep 
the credit flowing.  
With the rise in interest rates from 2005 onwards, many 
consumers could not pay their loans. Defaults increased 
and this had effects felt by all financial players who were 
part of this by way of insuring and holding securitized 
financial assets whose underlying assets were the same 
toxic loans.  
On September 15, 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed 
for bankruptcy, its assets totaled $639 billion. But, it also 
had $619 billion in debt. The balance sheet size was 
larger than the GDPs of several dozen African and Asian 
countries combined. Lehman's bankruptcy filing was the 
largest in history and it exposed the fact that with excess 
leveraging, no institution is too big to fail. 
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Figure 1: U.S. House Price Index 
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Figure 1. U.S. house price index. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: U.S. House Price Index 
 
Source: OECD Stats 
 
 
Figure 2. U.S. house price index. Source: OECD Stats. 
 
 
 
Now, the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe and 
U.S. is challenging the conventional wisdom and is 
creating fears of a double dip recession in 2012. Massive 
levels of debt and consumption beyond means and 
speedy financial innovation with lax regulation has put 
major economies of the world in a deep hole.  
U.S., the world's biggest economy, recently witnessed 
lowering of credit rating by Standard and Poor's (S and 
P). In 1980, the U.S. national debt stood at around $2 
trillion. By 2011, it stood at a staggering $15 trillion. Debt 
to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio in U.S. has 
climbed over 100% of GDP. This debt may become more 
costly as the riskiness of the treasury securities increase 
further.  
After the great recession, there are 7 million fewer jobs 
in the United States than there were four years ago. 
Some 25 million Americans who would like to work full-
time cannot get a job at the moment. Hurd and 
Rohwedder (2010) found that the effects of the recession 
were widespread:   between   November  2008  and  April 
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Figure 3. U.S. historical unemployment rates. Source: U.S. bureau of labor statistics.  
 
 
 
2010, about 39% of households surveyed had either 
been unemployed, had negative equity in their house or 
had been in arrears in their house payments. Reductions 
in spending were common especially following unemploy-
ment. Figure 3 shows that unemployment rose steeply 
during the crisis years (2006 to 2010) and is still on the 
higher side. 
Jagannathan (2009) explaining the structural reasons 
causing the crisis criticized the neoliberal trade paradigm 
of growth. They opined that as ﬁrms economize in the 
downturn, there will be increasing pressure on them to 
outsource jobs to foreign workers who are willing to work 
for a fraction of the domestic wage. This only adds to the 
underlying structural problem accentuating the recession. 
Along the same lines, Palley (2009) argued that current 
financial crisis was a result of a faulty U.S. 
macroeconomic paradigm. One flaw in this paradigm was 
the neo-liberal growth model adopted after 1980 that 
relied on debt and asset price inflation to drive demand in 
place of wage growth. A second flaw was the model of 
U.S. engagement with the global economy that created a 
triple economic hemorrhage of spending on imports, 
manufacturing job losses, and off-shoring of investment.  
With up-rise of BRIC, America’s manufacturing and 
even technological edge has migrated across the border 
and overseas. In the long run, this is decreasing U.S. 
national wealth, and also de-industrializing it. Indeed, in 
last thirty years, U.S., then the global manufacturing 
super power after the Second World War has now 
become the global super consumer of the cheap 
imported goods. (Katkov, 2010) 
Coming to the policy response to the crisis, Greenspan 
(2004) favored following a “strategy of addressing the 
bubble’s consequences rather than the bubble itself.” He 
based his idea on the fact that it is difficult for 
policymakers to identify a bubble in real time. But, 
Krugman (2008) mentioned that some economists indeed 
identified the house market bubble like Robert Schiller 
among others. 
Fed’s response to the crisis using monetary policy with 
ease in rates had been ineffective to say the least in last 
few years when interest rates were kept at near zero 
level since 2008. Fiscal stimulus again targeted the 
undisciplined financial sector which did not use the 
stimulus for extending credit to the private sector as 
much as was required. This led to the credit crunch and 
sluggish economic activity and which has persisted even 
after the severity of the crisis subsided.  
Subsequently, we point just a few factors that have 
been prime cause behind much of the economic 
problems being faced by U.S. or had been bad response 
to the crisis.  
 
I. The long-term habit of consumption beyond means. 
U.S. consumer debt has soared by 1700 percent over the 
past 40 years. With business cycles fluctuations, this is 
unsustainable. The securitization of consumer debt 
magnified the losses and created negative unjust effects 
on savers and taxpayers which had nothing to do with the 
mess.  
II. U.S. fiscal deficit exceeded $1.3 trillion in Fiscal year 
2011. Taking on credit was made extraordinarily easier 
for consumers, but the promised yet unsustainable and 
inefficient welfare spending showed recklessness on 
government’s part and encouraged public at large to be 
taking the same route.  
III. Share of U.S. gross domestic income accruing to 
finance and insurance, according to the Bureau of econo-
mic analysis, had risen fairly steadily from 2.3% in 1947 
to 7.9% in 2006 (Greenspan, 2010). These earnings are 
transaction costs for the productive sector. Amidst these 
highest earnings, the financial sector still could not do its 
job of matching credible business sector investors with 
limited  number of savers. This failure resulted in injustice 
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Figure 4. U.S. fiscal deficit (in billion $). Source: usgovernmentspending.com.  
 
 
 
to the savers and to the productive sector that was not 
part of the mess in the first place to lose credit lines amid 
credit crunch in post-crisis scenario. 
IV. Quantitative easing adopted time and again to rescue 
the economy discouraged savings, created even more 
fluctuation in real asset prices, and encouraged more 
speculation to profit from correct anticipation of inflation 
and financial asset prices rather to take the pain of 
productive enterprise which increases employment 
opportunities.  
V. Financial intermediation growing in massive proportion 
and delinked with productive sector. In the financial crisis 
of 2007 to 2009, the huge bail-out package to the few 
financial tycoons basically encouraged 'socialize losses 
and privatize gains' as remarked by Nobel laureate, 
Joseph Stieglitz. Financial institutions that were just 
supposed to be playing a supportive role to the 
productive economy got much bigger and unregulated 
through shadow banking practices.  
 
 
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS DEFIES CONVENTIONAL 
WISDOM 
 
In 1980, the U.S. national debt stood at around $2 trillion. 
By 2011, it stood at a staggering $15 trillion. For the first 
time, debt to GDP ratio in U.S. has climbed over 100% of 
GDP. Fiscal deficit has touched $1.3 trillion in fiscal 2011 
as shown in Figure 4. 
Likewise, Japan has a gross public debt which is 220% 
of its GDP. Similarly, the crisis hit European countries 
have debt to GDP ratio exceeding well over 100%. 
Though, everywhere, we see quantitative easing policy 
adopted by monetary authorities and rates touching zero 
bound.  But,   with    sovereign   default     risk     a   very    
likely possibility, yield on treasury securities is climbing by 
each passing day.  
Is there any validity left in the concept of risk free rate? 
The interest rate on a treasury bill is often used as the 
risk-free rate. But, the ongoing sovereign crisis in Europe 
and U.S. is challenging conventional wisdom. The bonds 
of Portugal and Cyprus have already been categorized as 
'junk' meaning having no value. United States has also 
seen a downgrade of its credit rating by S and P. 
Recently, France and Austria were stripped of their triple-
A credit rating. Three smaller euro-zone countries (Malta, 
Slovenia and Slovakia) also suffered a one-notch 
downgrade. Italy and Spain had their ratings knocked 
down by two notches (to BBB+ and A, respectively) (The 
Economist, 2012). 
In Greece, youth unemployment has reached 42.9% 
making it very difficult to go more deep down the road of 
introducing further austerity measures. In Spain, the new 
government announced a radical package of austerity 
measures, but the youth unemployment rate is now 
touching 45%. It seems very hard to avoid social unrest 
unless the problems are fixed soon.  
The crisis in Greece and much of Europe and even in 
North America had been caused by massive levels of 
debts. Excess leveraging is most dangerous in economic  
slowdowns. With the financial sector growing much larger 
in proportion to the productive sector and with lax 
regulation, the consequences were bound to be severe 
and they had been severe.  
In most monotheist religions, taking on excess level of 
debt and ‘interest’ had always been prohibited. The 
unbridled pursuit of greed also requires some external 
source of guidance than mere reliance on material 
animalistic instincts of a human soul. Religion provides 
the ethical  check  and call to  balance  material  pursuits 
 
 
 
 
with attention to misery of the underprivileged people. 
The world of today may have financial tycoons and 
large corporations having asset base exceeding the 
GDPs of dozens of African and Asian economies 
combined, but it also has unprecedented poverty, 
inequality and unemployment.  
Financial system which was supposed to compliment 
productive sector has overgrown in importance and made 
the productive economy enter deep in slump too. 
Taxpayer's money has been used to save undisciplined 
and highly leveraged financial institutions. Quantitative 
easing would increase inflation in the long run and act as 
a tax. Plus, the future generations will now inherit in each 
of the crisis country, the massive levels of debts and the 
consequent problems of unemployment, austerity 
measures, cut in welfare spending without having a say 
in the policies that led them to be inheriting such 
unprecedented problems.  
 
 
EFFICACY OF MONETARY POLICY 
 
Interest rates in U.S. reached the zero bound in 
December 2008. Recently, amid fears of double dip 
recession, the Fed has shown commitment to keep the 
policy rates low for at least the next two years.  
Great recession (2007 to 2009) compelled the Fed to 
keep the rates low. Economists especially from Chicago 
School (from where Milton Friedman belongs too) 
analyzing Great depression criticized the central bank for 
having not adopted monetary easing and thereby 
worsening the sentiments through inaction.  
In the 'Great Recession', the central bank in U.S. did not 
adopt tight monetary policy because inflation is tackled 
through non-market forces (subsidies and political 
influence in resource rich countries to meet demand at 
affordable prices) because U.S. did not have that 
financial capacity nor the political influence at the time of 
Great depression unlike today. But, this monetary easing 
has still not caused private investment and private sector 
borrowing to increase. 
Krugman (September 02, 2009) in his New York Times 
article titled "How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?" 
analyzed the current financial crisis and Fed's response 
in following words: 
  
"But zero, it turned out, is not low enough to end this 
recession. And the Fed cannot push rates below zero, 
since at near-zero rates, investors simply hoard cash 
rather than lending it out. So by late 2008, with interest 
rates basically at what macroeconomists call the "zero 
lower bound" even as the recession continued to deepen, 
conventional monetary policy had lost all traction." 
  
Therefore, the question again arises that how effective is 
the monetary policy in recession and depression times. 
The  bearish  sentiments   in   economic   downturns,   as  
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Keynes said, can only be revived by public investment 
either through increasing government expenditure in 
public sector enterprises or by providing subsidies to 
private sector enterprises. No matter how hard one tries 
to deny it, when one considers the bail-out package for 
financial sector as well as for producing sector in U.S and 
the huge subsidies provided by OECD countries to their 
farmers, one cannot say government has no role to play 
in an economy. 
But, rather than promising unsustainable and inefficient 
welfare spending in healthcare and other heads, the first 
and foremost duty of the government was to improve 
governance and oversight. As the crisis unfolded, it 
became explicit that the regulation could not keep pace 
with financial innovation and that unfettered financial 
system currently dominated by few big players seeking 
unbridled self-interest is not to be completely relied upon. 
If the current crisis leads to stagflation, then in those 
circumstances, monetary stimulus fails and further exa-
cerbate the situation with output decreasing and capital 
scarcity due to eventual increase in interest rates.  
It remains to be seen whether the expansionary 
monetary policy approach will pay rich dividends, but it 
cannot be denied that developed world in general 
including Europe and U.S. in particular are far away from 
coming out of crisis even after the great recession. 
 
 
THE WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS 
 
Unrestrained chase of self-interest, moral relativism, 
incentive-led economic choices and indifference to 
collective responsibilities has led to engender societies 
where economic interests have become the solitary basis 
of establishing and maintaining relationships. 
This inner void of identity and purpose at individual 
level and social void in the form of a polarized society 
bound together only for economic interests can be better 
studied and dealt with incorporating religion. 
Humans are much more than utility maximizing 
species. They are capable of using both instrumental 
(material rationality) and critical reasons (moral rationa-
lity) to differentiate right from wrong and need 
reinforcement to adopt virtues influenced by an inner 
urge other than just material interests. 
This inner urge can be reawakened by looking beyond 
utility maximization models to re-acknowledge the 
principal fact that humans are moral being than just an 
instrument for maximum material advancement for self. 
Some may argue that current paradigm can be fixed and 
this great recession is an anomaly and an exception, not 
a general consequence and failures of certain capitalistic 
principles. But, it must be noted that only at this time, 
developed world was caught in a crisis, else the 
developing world and emerging countries have faced far 
too many crises after 1970s. The phrase ‘Trickle up’ was 
famously  used  by  Nobel laureate Joseph Stieglitz in his  
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response to how current mainstream institutions and 
policies had failed to provide benefit to masses.  
Even the success stories of China and India exhibited 
the fact that high growth rate consistently even for a 
longer duration in last two decades has not resulted in 
decrease in inequality of income. Hence, even institutions 
like IMF and World Bank had now finally realized and 
decided to combat poverty with a direct approach. 
Problem seems to be deep rooted and not restricted to a 
particular choice of policy, but a choice of institutions that 
can work for sustainable growth and development and 
moderate the business cycles.  
A new paradigm is needed which put the focus back on 
productive enterprise, brings recovery with job creation, 
limit speculative financial institutions and instruments and 
improve corporate governance by influencing the 
incentives more deeply. This will require direct incentives 
to productive sector through expansionary fiscal policy, 
public investment in infrastructure, rationalizing inefficient 
public welfare spending and improved governance and 
oversight of financial institutions and instruments. In the 
post crisis scenario, jobless recovery is no long term 
cure. 
Fundamentally, there is also a need to revisit the 
indicators and barometers of progress and development. 
GDP alone is not the single most important indicator 
anymore. Belief in unfettered markets and rational 
behavior also needs to be revisited, rather than taught 
and preached as some sacred value judgment.  
The basic postulates of a new paradigm will be that 
less is better if it is distributed fairly equally than more 
wealth distributed unequally. Efficiency measures need to 
include social objectives. Priorities need to be set right 
and we must seek worldwide consensus on the following 
issues: 
 
1. Growth is important but development is pivotal.  
2. Growth that does not result in development is less 
desirable.  
3. Reducing inequality is more important than increasing 
the growth rate. 
4. Social optimization is more important than profit 
optimization.  
5. Achievement of social optimization if not possible 
solely through the private sector, must be brought about 
through government intervention, whenever necessary. 
Horizontal as well as vertical equity are both important. 
 
To get out of this mess, the long-term habit of 
consumption beyond means needs to change. It is not 
just the government who consumes/spends beyond 
means, but people in general and in vast majority too in 
U.S., where changing habits is important. It brings again 
the question of what could be governed and what 
societies implicitly and intentionally need to change 
themselves   permanently.   This   is   where   the    social 
 
 
 
 
sciences and comprehensive doctrines like religion can 
come in to shape and improve habits and expand the 
worldview.  
Tax cuts and public sector projects of capacity building 
can induce investment when labour supply is elastic as in 
current times. This is important as fiscal bleeding cannot 
occur incessantly which either burdens the taxpayer or 
the general masses through inflation tax with quantitative 
easing. Easing policies to get inflow of foreign investment 
is very important especially with the crisis in Middle East 
and in Euro zone. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The project to enable consumers realizing ‘The American 
Dream’ through predatory lending and encouraging 
leverage at all levels of society proved fatally unsustain-
able. The unsustainable promised welfare spending also 
did not help in restraining recklessness and only increas-
ed the size of fiscal deficit and misery of populace.  
Quantitative easing and fiscal bleeding is going to bring 
inflation and will be detrimental to savers, taxpayers and 
future generations. This paper also argued that response 
to the crisis requires revisiting the value judgments which 
led to cornering of any thoughtful consideration of the fact 
that regulation and oversight is necessary to control and 
avoid crisis in today’s complex economic world which is 
in bad shape now in terms of rising inequality of income, 
wealth and limited public access to influence and benefit 
from policy making.  
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